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Highlights 
 Following TBI difficulties in pragmatic comprehension and production are detectable 
 The paper investigates the relation between pragmatics, EF and ToM in TBI 
 Increasing difficulty is exhibited in the pragmatic phenomena investigated  
 ToM and EF have a limited role in explaining TBI pragmatic ability 
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Abstract 
Quality of life and social integration are strongly influenced by the ability to communicate and 
previous research has shown that pragmatic abilities can be specifically impaired in individuals 
with traumatic brain injury (TBI). In addition, TBI usually results in damage to the 
frontotemporal lobes with a consequent impairment of cognitive functions, i.e., attention, 
memory, executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). The role of the underlying 
cognitive deficits in determining the communicative-pragmatic difficulties of an individual 
with TBI is not yet completely clear.   
This study examined the relationship between the ability to understand and produce 
various kinds of communicative acts, (i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic) and the above-
mentioned cognitive and ToM abilities following TBI. Thirty-five individuals with TBI and 
thirty-five healthy controls were given tasks assessing their ability to comprehend and produce 
sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts belonging to the linguistic and extralinguistic 
scales of the Assessment Battery for Communication (ABaCo), together with a series of EF 
and ToM tasks.   
The results showed that, when compared to healthy individuals, participants with TBI 
performed poorly overall in the comprehension and production of all the pragmatic phenomena 
investigated, (i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts), and they also exhibited 
impaired performance at the level of all the cognitive functions examined. Individuals with 
TBI also showed a decreasing trend in performance in dealing with sincere, deceitful and ironic 
communicative acts, on both the comprehension and production subscales of the linguistic and 
extralinguistic scales. Furthermore, a hierarchical regression analysis revealed that – in patients 
with TBI but not in the controls – EF had a significant effect on the comprehension of 
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linguistic and extralinguistic irony only, while the percentage of explained variance increased 
with the inclusion of theory of mind. Indeed, ToM had a significant role in determining 
patients’ performance in the extralinguistic production of sincere and deceitful communicative 
acts, linguistic and extralinguistic comprehension of deceit and the linguistic production of 
irony. However, with regard to the performance of patients with TBI in the various pragmatic 
tasks investigated, (i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts), EF was able to 
explain the pattern of patients’ scores in the linguistic and extralinguistic comprehension but 
not in production ability. Furthermore, ToM seemed not to be able to explain the decreasing 
trend in the performance of patients in managing the various kinds of communicative acts 
investigated.  
 
1. Introduction  
Following a brain injury, the ability to communicate effectively with others is often 
compromised, with negative consequences for the quality of life in terms of reintegration into 
society, participation in social and occupational roles, vocational and academic achievement 
and interpersonal relationships (Dahlberg et al., 2006; Struchen, Pappadis, Sander, Burrows & 
Myszka, 2011).  
A wide body of literature has shown in recent decades that traumatic brain injury (TBI) 
may result, among other things, in communicative-pragmatic impairment (Cummings, 2017; 
Finch, French, Ou & Fleming, 2016; Galetto, Andreetta, Zettin & Marini, 2013; Key-Delyria, 
2016; Marini, Zettin, Bencich, Bosco & Galetto, 2017; Murphy, Huang, Montgomery & 
Turkstra 2015; Rigon, Voss, Turkstra, Mutlu & Duff, 2016). Non-verbal or extralinguistic 
ability, i.e., the capacity to communicate with another person through gestures, facial 
expressions and body posture, is also impaired (Bara, Cutica & Tirassa, 2001; Rousseaux, 
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Verigneaux & Kozlowski, 2010; Turkstra et al., 2017). Individuals with TBI usually have 
difficulty understanding communicative pragmatic phenomena that require inferences to be 
drawn (Bosco, Angeleri, Sacco & Bara, 2015), such as indirect speech acts (Evans & Hux, 
2011; McDonald, Fisher & Flanagan, 2016), irony (Angeleri et al., 2008; Martin & McDonald, 
2005), sarcasm (McDonald, 1999; Channon, Pellijeff & Rule, 2005) and other forms of 
figurative language (Yang, Fuller, Khodaparast & Krawczyk, 2010). The inferential process 
refers to the cognitive ability that allows a person to fill the gap that exists between what a 
speaker literally says, (for example, “You are a really nice person”), and what s/he really 
means, (for example, when being ironic if the interlocutor was rude) (Dennis, Purvis, Barnes, 
Wilkinson & Winner, 2001; Grice, 1975; Searle, 1975).   
Analysing both linguistic and extralinguistic expressive modalities, Angeleri et al. (2008) 
reported a trend of decreasing ability among individuals with TBI to appreciate communicative 
acts uttered with different communicative intentions, i.e., to be sincere, to be deceitful or to be 
ironic. Following the theory of cognitive pragmatics (Bara, 2010), Angeleri and colleagues 
(2008) explained this pattern of decreasing ability on the basis of the increasing inferential 
complexity involved in the different pragmatic tasks examined (see also Bara et al., 2001; 
Bara, Tirassa & Zettin, 1997).  
The theory of cognitive pragmatics provides the framework for analysing and comparing 
different kinds of pragmatic phenomena according to the inferential ability involved (Bara, 
2010). Its theoretical assumptions are valid for explaining pragmatic phenomena expressed 
using both language and extralinguistic means, for example, gestures (see also Bara & Tirassa, 
1999). According to cognitive pragmatics, when two people communicate they are acting on 
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the basis of a stereotyped pattern of social knowledge, shared between the participants in the 
dialogue (see also Airenti, Bara & Colombetti, 1993a; 1993b).  
In order to comprehend the interlocutor’s communicative intentions, a person must 
recognize this stereotyped pattern of knowledge shared with the interlocutor. Consider the 
following example from Bara (2010): imagine someone enters an office where a man is 
working and says: [1] “It’s raining outside.” While there can be no doubt as to the literal 
meaning of the utterance, the man sitting at his desk in the office would certainly be 
disoriented. He would only be able to draw the appropriate inferences and provide a 
meaningful answer if he understood that [1] meant he shouldn’t go out or that he should close 
the window or take his umbrella with him, or if he realized it had been said for a clear reason. 
In this activity, the inferential process involved in the comprehension and production of a 
communicative act uttered with the intention of being sincere, deceitful or ironic, can be 
analysed (see Table 1).  
In the comprehension of sincere communicative acts, what the speaker says is in line with 
his/her private knowledge. Concerning the inferential process involved, to comprehend or 
produce a sincere communicative act, which is the standard case, the partner simply has to 
refer the speaker’s utterance to the knowledge shared with him (see Bara, 2010). By contrast, 
in the comprehension and production of deceitful and ironic communicative acts, which are 
exempla of non-standard communications, more complex inferential processes are required 
(see Bara, 2010). Specifically, when a speaker performs a deceitful communicative act, his/her 
intention contrasts with his/her private knowledge, but it is not in contrast with the knowledge 
s/he shares with the interlocutor. In deceit, the partner must handle the difference between what 
is said and what the speaker privately knows. In the case of irony, the speaker’s communicative 
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intention again contrasts with his/her private knowledge, as in the previous case, but it is also 
in conflict with the knowledge s/he shares with the partner. This makes irony more difficult to 
deal with than deceit (for a more detailed explanation please see also Bara, 2010).  
 
Table 1. Increases in the inferential processes involved in comprehending/producing a sincere, 
deceitful and ironic communication act (adapted from Bosco et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The existence of a trend of increasing difficulty in the comprehension and production of 
sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts has been pointed out in studies with children 
(Bosco, Angeleri, Colle, Sacco & Bara, 2013; Bosco & Bucciarelli, 2008), patients with 
schizophrenia (Colle et al., 2013) and those with brain injury, such as TBI (Angeleri et al., 
2008), left-brain damage (Gabbatore et al., 2014), right-brain damage (Parola et al., 2016) and 
autism spectrum disorders (Angeleri, Gabbatore, Bosco, Sacco & Colle, 2016).   
  
1.1. Relation Between Cognitive and ToM Abilities and Pragmatics in Individuals with TBI  
In recent years, an increasing body of evidence has shown that TBI may cause problems with 
theory of mind (Geraci, Surian, Ferraro & Cantagallo, 2010; Milders, Ietswaart, Crawford & 
The interlocutor’s communicative act: 
Communicative 
intention 
Contrasts with 
his/her private 
knowledge? 
Contrasts with the 
knowledge shared with 
the partner? 
Inferential 
load 
Sincere No No + 
Deceit Yes No ++ 
Irony Yes Yes +++ 
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Currie, 2006; Muller et al., 2010; Spikman, Timmerman, Milders, Veenstra & van der Naalt, 
2012; Turkstra, Norman, Mutlu & Duff, 2018; for a review see Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-
Carrion, 2010), the ability to comprehend one’s own and another person’s mental states 
(Premack & Woodruf, 1978). A fully developed (Bosco, Gabbatore & Tirassa, 2014; Brizio, 
Gabbatore, Tirassa & Bosco, 2015) and intact theory of mind is necessary to understand a 
partner’s communicative intention (Happé & Loth, 2002; Tirassa, Bosco & Colle, 2006a; 
2006b). Some authors have suggested that a ToM deficit in individuals with TBI could play a 
crucial role in explaining their pragmatic difficulty (Byom & Turkstra, 2012; Channon et al. 
2005; Happé, Brownell & Winner, 1999; Havet-Thomassin, Allain, Etcharry-Bouyx & Le 
Gall, 2006; Martin & McDonald, 2003; McDonald, Fisher, Flanagan & Honan, 2017; 
McDonald & Flanagan, 2004).  
In addition, a deficit in terms of executive functioning is a common feature following TBI, 
as a consequence of impairment in the frontal areas of the brain. The term refers to goal-
directed behaviours (Miyake et al. 2000), including working memory, shifting and planning 
(Ashman, Gordon, Cantor & Hibbard, 2006; Dikmen et al., 2009; Smith & Jonides, 1999; 
Sullivan, Riccio & Castillo, 2009; Thomas, Snyder, Pietrzak & Maruff, 2014). The above-
mentioned abilities seem to have a significant role in the capacity to communicate efficiently, 
and they may be at least partially responsible for pragmatic impairment in TBI at different 
levels and to varying extents (McDonald & Pearce, 1998; Channon & Watts, 2003; Key-
DeLyria & Altmann, 2016; Marini, Zettin & Galetto, 2014; for a meta-analysis see Rowley et 
al., 2017). Douglas (2010) investigated pragmatic-communication difficulties in TBI as well as 
difficulties related to the capacity to handle information and the speed of verbal processing. 
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The data showed that executive skills might account for a third of the variance in pragmatic 
performance of people with TBI.   
Recently, McDonald and colleagues (2014) detected a unique effect of both ToM and EF – 
specifically, inhibition and cognitive flexibility – on the performance of TBI patients in a 
naturalistic speech-production task. These authors’ results suggest that ToM does play a role in 
communicative ability, but only when the communicative task makes high demands on 
inhibition control. Byom and Turkstra (2017) used a discourse task in which EF and ToM were 
manipulated across three conditions, i.e., high-ToM, high-EF and baseline conditions. EF was 
measured as disfluency error rates during the discourse between individuals with TBI and the 
examiner, and ToM was measured as the number of mental state terms (MSTs) used in the 
discourse.  
Similarly to McDonald et al. (2014), the authors found a reduction of MSTs in the high-EF 
condition in the TBI group, suggesting that an increased executive demand can reduce the 
ability of individuals with TBI to consider mental states during the discourse. On the other 
hand, no differences were found in disfluency error rates between the individuals with TBI and 
the controls. Finally, in a more recent study, Bosco, Parola, Sacco, Zettin and Angeleri (2017) 
showed that cognitive and ToM impairment plays a role in explaining both linguistic and 
extralinguistic communicative performance in individuals with TBI. The authors performed a 
regression analysis where attention and long-term memory, EF and ToM were entered as 
predictors of the pragmatic performance of individuals with TBI. The percentage of explained 
variance increased significantly with the inclusion of ToM and EF (cognitive flexibility, 
planning and working memory).  
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Even fewer studies have investigated the extent to which cognitive and ToM impairment 
in individuals with TBI can affect the comprehension and production of a specific kind of 
communicative act, such as indirect speech acts, deceit or irony. Channon and Watts (2003) 
highlighted the significant contribution of inhibitory processes in explaining the ability of 
individuals with TBI to comprehend indirect speech acts. The authors also included other 
executive tasks in their investigation, such as working memory (WM) and multitasking. 
Although difficulties were detected in all the tasks, WM and multitasking performance did not 
appear to be associated with performance in pragmatic tasks. Martin and McDonald (2005) 
investigated cognitive correlates of the comprehension of irony. The authors identified physical 
inferential reasoning, defined as the ability to understand “complex non-mental inferences by 
applying the principles of physical causation to a sequence of events”, as a good predictor of 
this capacity. By contrast, poor performance on ToM tasks was not able to account for patients’ 
impaired abilities in terms of irony comprehension. The authors also investigated other 
cognitive components, such as WM, conceptual reasoning and cognitive flexibility, but none of 
these were shown to be a good predictor of the participant’s ability to understand irony. Muller 
et al. (2010) investigated ToM in individuals with TBI using a set of ToM tasks, including the 
faux pas test (Stone et al., 1998), a first- and second-order false belief task, a character 
intention task (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé & Decety, 2000) and the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). The authors also employed 
a communicative task taken from the Montreal Evaluation of Communication (MEC) (Joanette 
et al., 2004), a protocol that requires participants to comprehend direct or indirect speech acts. 
Their results showed that participants with TBI performed worse than healthy controls on all 
verbal and non-verbal ToM tasks, with the exception of the first-order belief attribution task, 
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confirming the difficulty experienced by individuals with TBI in appreciating the mental states 
of others. Participants with TBI also showed a deficit in the recognition of both direct and 
indirect speech acts, and in indirect speech act tasks correlated with tasks assessing verbal 
ToM, i.e., the faux pas test and false belief tasks. The authors interpreted this result as 
confirming the relationship between ToM impairments and pragmatic communication skills 
but suggested that other cognitive functions may be responsible at least for the deficits in non-
verbal ToM tasks observed in individuals with TBI. On the whole, most of the experimental 
evidence points to a relationship between communicative-pragmatic ability and cognitive 
functioning, especially with regard to executive functions (Bosco et al., 2017; McDonald et al., 
2014; McDonald, Fisher, Flanagan, & Honan, 2015; Honan et al., 2015; Byom & Turkstra, 
2017; LeBlanc et al., 2014; Channon & Watts, 2003) and ToM (Muller et al., 2010; Channon, 
Pellijeff & Rule, 2005; Douglas, 2010; McDonald et al., 2015), the only exception being the 
study by Martin and McDonald (2005). Recently Rowley et al. (2017) conducted a meta-
analysis showing that EF have a moderate-to-strong correlation with pragmatic comprehension. 
However, few studies (Martin & McDonald, 2005; Muller et al., 2010; Channon & Watts, 
2003) have investigated specifically the relationships of different communicative phenomena, 
such as indirect speech acts, deceit and irony with executive functioning and theory of mind. 
No previous study directly compared the comprehension and production of different 
communicative acts and their relations with executive and ToM functions in the same 
individuals with TBI. Thus, it is still unknown whether the impairment of specific executive 
function processes, (e.g., planning, inhibition, working memory and cognitive flexibility) or 
ToM components, may be associated with the impairment of specific pragmatic phenomena. 
Finally, no study, as far as we know, has investigated the role of ToM and EF in the ability of 
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patients with TBI to comprehend and produce pragmatic phenomena, i.e., sincere, deceitful and 
ironic communicative acts, expressed through extralinguistic means, i.e., gestures and body 
movements.  
 
2. The Present Study  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the possible role of EF and ToM ability in explaining the 
capacity of individuals with TBI to comprehend and produce communicative acts expressed 
with the intention of being sincere, deceitful or ironic and requiring an increased inferential 
ability. In line with the current literature, we expect that:  
i. Individuals with TBI, when compared to healthy controls, will perform worse in the 
comprehension and in the production of linguistic and extralinguistic communicative 
pragmatic tasks, i.e., sincere, ironic and deceitful communicative acts. 
ii. In both linguistic and extralinguistic communication, individuals with TBI will show a 
trend of increasing difficulty in the comprehension and production of different kinds of 
pragmatic phenomena, from the easiest to the most difficult, i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic 
communicative acts, based on the increasing inferential load involved.    
iii. Individuals with TBI will show more difficulties, when compared to healthy controls, in 
the cognitive functions investigated, i.e., working memory, attention, long-term memory, 
planning and theory of mind. We therefore expect to observe a relation between poor 
performance in the cognitive and ToM tasks and pragmatic skills relating to the comprehension 
and production of sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts.  
However, given the role played by the inferential processes involved in the investigated 
phenomena, we also hypothesize that:  
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iv. The deficits in such cognitive and ToM abilities alone will not be able to explain the 
decrease in the TBI patients’ ability to understand and produce the various pragmatic tasks, 
i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts.   
 
3. Methods and Materials  
3.1 Participants  
A group1 of 35 participants with TBI (29 males) and a group of 35 healthy individuals took 
part in the study. The experimental TBI group ranged in age from 20 to 69 years (M = 37.51; 
SD = 12.25); their education ranged from 5 to 18 years of schooling (M = 10.83; SD = 3.17). 
The participants’ clinical details are presented in Table 2. On the basis of the Glasgow Coma 
Scale scores, which were between 3 and 13, individuals with TBI were classified as having 
moderate to severe head injury (see Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). The time after onset ranged  
from 3 to 312 months (M = 63.57; SD = 74.34). All the participants in the clinical sample  
  
                                                 
1 This sample included 10 new participants (5 patients and 5 controls) with Bosco, Parola, Sacco, Zettin, & Angeleri (2017). 
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Table 2. Demographic and neurological details of individuals with TBI 
 
 
reported diffuse brain injuries following traffic accidents. However, an MRI scan detected that 
most of the participants also suffered from focal damage in various brain areas. All TBI 
participants were living at home with their caregiver (partner or family) and were in a post-
acute phase. None of the individuals with TBI had a history of neurological disease, psychiatric 
ID Sex Age 
Education 
(years) 
Time post-onset 
(months) 
Lesional area 
Glasgow Coma Scale 
TBI1 
TBI2 
TBI3 
TBI4 
TBI5 
TBI6 
TBI7 
TBI8 
TBI9 
TBI10 
TBI11 
TBI12 
TBI13 
TBI14 
TBI15 
TBI16 
TBI17 
TBI18 
TBI19 
TBI20 
TBI21 
TBI22 
TBI23 
TBI24 
TBI25 
TBI26 
TBI27 
TBI28 
TBI29 
TBI30 
TBI31 
TBI32 
TBI33 
TBI34 
TBI35 
M 
F 
F 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
33 
37 
26 
45 
35 
49 
20 
41 
27 
32 
32 
23 
31 
68 
59 
37 
42 
54 
21 
29 
39 
36 
32 
53 
24 
45 
36 
38 
42 
28 
39 
42 
25 
24 
69 
13 
8 
18 
13 
8 
11 
8 
8 
8 
13 
11 
13 
11 
5 
11 
8 
13 
18 
8 
13 
8 
13 
10 
18 
8 
13 
10 
8 
13 
13 
8 
8 
8 
11 
11 
138 
15 
30 
74 
228 
64 
41 
36 
35 
51 
23 
19 
120 
3 
7 
46 
18 
48 
32 
3 
3 
17 
34 
66 
62 
65 
252 
192 
21 
60 
17 
312 
16 
55 
22 
Right frontoparietal 
Right frontoparietotemporal 
Right frontoparietotemporal 
Bilateral frontoparietal 
Bilateral frontal 
Right frontotemporoparietal 
Frontal-diffuse injury 
Right temporal 
Left frontal 
Right frontotemporoparietal 
Left temporal - bilateral parietal 
Bilateral frontotemporal 
Left frontal 
Right frontotemporal 
Left frontoparietal 
Right frontotemporal 
Right frontotemporal 
Left frontotemporal 
Bilateral frontotemporoparietal 
Right frontotemporal 
Bilateral frontal 
Right frontotemporal 
Right parietal 
Right frontotemporal 
Left frontotemporal 
Right frontoparietotemporal 
Right parietotemporal 
Bilateral frontal 
Right frontal 
Left frontotemporal 
Right temporoparietal 
Right temporoparietal 
Right parietotemporal 
Left frontotemporal 
Right frontal 
 
4 
3 
8 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
7 
3 
5 
5 
4 
3 
3 
6 
3 
13 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
6 
3 
4 
8 
5 
4 
6 
5 
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illness, previous head injury, stroke, use of antipsychotic medication or substance abuse 
disorder. All the participants were right-handed, and all provided informed consent.  
Inclusion criteria for the study included being an Italian native speaker, at least 18 years of 
age with at least three months having elapsed since brain injury. Moreover, to be included, 
participants needed to display adequate linguistic and cognitive skills, as tested by the 
denomination scale of the Aachener Aphasie Test (AAT) (Huber, Poeck, Weniger & Willmes, 
1983; cut-off: no deficit), the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein, Folstein & 
McHugh, 1975; cut-off: 24/30) and the Token Test (De Renzi & Vignolo, 1962; cut-off: 5/6). 
Exclusion criteria for both the clinical and the control group included prior history of TBI or 
other neurological disease, neuropsychiatric illness or communication problems and premorbid 
alcohol or drug addiction.   
The control group consisted of 35 healthy participants ranging in age from 19 to 64 years 
(M = 37.26; SD = 11.58); their education ranged from 5 to 18 years of schooling (M = 11.31; 
SD = 3.19). The healthy controls were closely matched to the TBI individuals in terms of age 
(t-test: t (1,68) = .090; p = .93) and schooling (t-test: t (1,68) = .64; p = .53) as well as gender (29 
males). None of them had other brain damage or a history of neurological disorders.   
The neuropsychological and communicative-pragmatic tasks were administered 
individually during three separate experimental sessions, each lasting about one hour. All the 
patients provided their informed consent to participating in the study. The study was approved 
by our institutional review board, the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, 
University of Turin, Italy.  
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3.2 Communicative-Pragmatic Assessment   
We used items belonging to the linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the Assessment Battery 
for Communication (ABaCo) (Angeleri, Bosco, Gabbatore, Bara & Sacco, 2012; Sacco et al., 
2008). Each scale is organized into two subsets of tasks – subscales – assessing comprehension 
and production abilities respectively. The linguistic scale assesses the comprehension and 
production of communicative acts expressed primarily using linguistic means. The 
extralinguistic scale also assesses the comprehension and production of communicative acts, 
but only expressed using extralinguistic means, (i.e., gestures) only. The two scales include the 
same communicative acts, and for this reason, the tasks are described together.  
We used the following tasks to assess the comprehension of linguistic and extralinguistic 
communicative acts.  
 Sincere communicative acts (direct and indirect), deceit and irony. The examiner showed 
the participants short clips (20-25 seconds each) where two agents were engaged in a 
communicative exchange. The actor asked a question and the partner replied. The participant 
was required to understand the communicative act portrayed by the actors. In the tasks on the 
linguistic scale the actors communicated verbally, whereas in the tasks on the extralinguistic 
scale they communicated using gestures only. An example of each type of item, in English, is 
provided in Appendix A. 
In order to assess the production of linguistic and extralinguistic communicative acts, we 
used the following.   
 Sincere communicative acts, deceit and irony. The examiner showed the participants short 
clips (20-25 seconds each) where two agents were engaged in a communicative exchange. The 
actor was communicating something to the partner. The video stopped, and the participant was 
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asked to assume the partner’s perspective in answering the actor. In the tasks on the linguistic 
scale the communicative interactions occurred in the linguistic modality and the participant 
was required to reply verbally. In the tasks on the extralinguistic scale the actors performed 
communicative gestures without any language support and the subject had to reply using 
gestures only. An example of each type of item, in English, is provided in Appendix A. 
Each subscale (linguistic comprehension, linguistic production, extralinguistic 
comprehension, extralinguistic production) contained the same number of experimental tasks:  
- four sincere communicative acts   
- four deceitful communicative acts  
- four ironic communicative acts.  
The actors’ utterances in each clip contained a controlled number of words (7 ± 2), in 
order to maintain a constant memory and attention requirement.  
The experimenter explained the task at the beginning of the experimental session and the 
session started only when the participants said they had understood the tasks. Furthermore, the 
participants were told that they could interrupt the experimental session to ask for clarification 
at any time. For the items included in the linguistic subscale (both in comprehension and in 
production) participants had to produce an utterance. Participants used spoken language also 
for stating their understanding of the items belonging to the extralinguistic comprehension 
subscale, (e.g., “with that gesture the actor meant...”). For items included in the extralinguistic 
production subscale, participants had to produce a response using extralinguistic means, i.e., 
gestures or body movements (see Appendix A for examples). 
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3.3   Cognitive Functions and Theory of Mind Assessment  
Several neuropsychological and theory of mind tests were administered to TBI patients and 
healthy controls, in order to assess the most important cognitive functions. The following list 
summarizes the cognitive functions investigated and the corresponding neuropsychological 
tests chosen (see Appendix B for a detailed description of the tasks).  
Basic cognitive functions:   
• Long-term memory: deferred recall test (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987)  
• Attention: attentive matrices (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987)   
 
Executive functions:  
 Working memory, defined as the ability to actively maintain and manipulate information (Smith & 
Jonides, 1999; Conway et al., 2005): disyllabic word repetition test (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987), 
Corsi’s block-tapping test (Orsini et al., 1987) and immediate recall test (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987).  
• Cognitive flexibility, defined as the ability to switch attention and thinking in response to 
the demands of a specific situation (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Johnco, Wuthrich & 
Rapee, 2013; Kortte, Horner & Windham, 2002): Trail Making Test (Part B – Part A) 
(Reitan, 1958).  
• Planning, defined as the ability to plan a series of actions or thoughts in a sequential order 
in a goal-directed fashion (Smith & Jonides, 1999; Sullivan, Riccio & Castillo, 2009; 
Thomas, Snyder, Pietrzak & Maruff, 2014): Tower of London test (Shallice, 1982) and 
Elithorn’s maze test (Elithorn, 1955).  
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Theory of Mind:   
• First-order theory of mind: Smarties task (Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989), Sally-
Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985).  
• Advanced theory of mind: a selection of six Strange Stories (Happé, 1994), excluding 
those testing communicative phenomena.  
 
 3.4   Procedure  
The experimental sessions were recorded on video, and the scoring procedure was performed 
offline. Two independent raters, blind with respect to the aims of the research, observed the 
video-recorded administration and coded the answers provided by the participants. The order 
of the neuropsychological and communicative-pragmatic tasks was randomized and 
counterbalanced across participants. 
According to the ABaCo instruction manual, possible scores were 0 (incorrect) or 1 
(correct) for each question. For example, in both the linguistic and extralinguistic scales, the 
participants obtain a point in the comprehension of sincere communicative acts if they 
understand what the actor expressed and if they recognize what the utterance/gesture implies. 
In the production of sincere communicative acts, the participants obtain a point if they have 
produced a communicative act congruent with the question. More details concerning the 
structure of the Assessment Battery for Communication and its scoring procedures are 
provided in Angeleri et al. (2016), Bosco et al. (2013), Parola et al. (2016) and Sacco et al. 
(2008). 
We calculated the level of agreement of the two independent judges using the intraclass  
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correlation coefficient (ICC). The resulting ICC value of .77 indicates a good agreement 
between the raters, since according to Altman’s criteria (1991), values ranging from .60 to .80 
are defined as adequate and indicate substantial agreement. In cases of discrepancies, the 
judges discussed the scores they had attributed until they reached an agreement. 
The neuropsychological and ToM tasks were coded according to the criteria described in 
the literature. 
 
3.5 Data Analysis  
To investigate significant differences in pragmatic performance between the experimental 
group and control group, participants’ scores were submitted to a 2x3 ANOVA, with the type 
of participant (individual with TBI, healthy control) as the between-subjects factor and the type 
of phenomenon (sincere, deceitful or ironic) as the within-subjects factor. The same analysis 
was conducted separately for the linguistic comprehension, linguistic production, 
extralinguistic comprehension and extralinguistic production subscales of the ABaCo.  
In order to investigate the performance of patients in comparison to the performance of 
controls in neuropsychological tests assessing cognitive functions and ToM, we used a series 
of independent t-tests. We compared each of the cognitive domains investigated separately, 
(i.e., WM, long-term memory, attention, cognitive flexibility, planning and overall theory of 
mind tasks). 
To examine the role of the investigated cognitive functions and theory of mind in the 
understanding and production of different communicative acts, we performed a series of 
hierarchical regression analyses. As the dependent variable we used the respective scores for 
the comprehension and production of the different communicative phenomena investigated, 
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i.e., sincere communicative acts, deceit and irony, separately for the linguistic and 
extralinguistic scales. Moreover, we inserted basic background cognitive functions – attention 
and long-term memory, executive functions – WM, cognitive flexibility and planning and 
theory of mind (ToM) respectively as predictors (see Table 5). In line with Parola, Berardinelli 
and Bosco (2018) we inserted the cognitive and theory of mind functions in the models in three 
consecutive stages on the basis of their increasing importance in explaining pragmatic 
performance. In the first stage of the model we inserted basic background cognitive ability, i.e., 
attention and long-term memory, as these could be considered the most basic cognitive 
functions necessary to comprehend and produce each type of communicative act. In the first 
step we also inserted the post-onset time, to control for whether spontaneous recovery may 
have also influenced pragmatic performance. In the second stage, we considered executive 
functions, i.e., WM, cognitive flexibility and planning. We included EF in the second step 
since some authors (Miyake et al., 2000; Diamond, 2013) had considered EF as a set of top-
down cognitive processes necessary for the control and regulation of goal-directed behaviour. 
In the third and last stage, we included theory of mind. Theory of mind was included in the 
third and final step since previous studies showed that background cognitive abilities such as 
attention, as well as executive functions, have a role in explaining the ability to perform this 
type of task (Honan, McDonald, Gowland, Fisher & Randall, 2015; McDonald et al., 2014).  
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4.   Results  
4.1   Pragmatic Performance  
Descriptive statistics of the different communicative acts investigated, i.e., sincere 
communicative acts, deceit and irony, on the comprehension and production subscales of the 
linguistic and extralinguistic scales, are reported in Table 3.  
On the linguistic comprehension subscale, the ANOVA showed a significant main effect 
of the type of participant (F(1,68) = 31.62; p < .001; η2p = .32). The experimental group 
performed significantly worse than the control group on the linguistic comprehension subscale. 
The main effect of the type of pragmatic phenomenon was also significant (F(2,136) = 9.04; p < 
.001; η2p = .12). The interaction between the type of participant and the type of pragmatic 
phenomenon was not significant (F(2, 136) =2.87; p = .06; η2p = .041). We performed a linear 
contrast which revealed a linear decrease in scores depending on the type of pragmatic 
phenomenon (F(1,68) =10.13; p = .002; η2p = .13). The highest scores were obtained in the tasks 
concerning the sincere communicative acts, followed by deceit and irony (see Table 3). 
Pairwise post hoc comparisons revealed that participants obtained higher scores in linguistic 
comprehension of sincere communicative acts compared to linguistic comprehension of irony 
(p = .007), while no difference was found  between linguistic comprehension of sincere 
communicative acts and deceit (p = 1.0). Participants found linguistic comprehension of irony 
more difficult than linguistic comprehension of deceit (p = .001). 
As regards the linguistic production subscale, the ANOVA showed a main effect of the 
type of participant (F(1,68) = 36.95; p < .001; η2p = .35). The experimental group performed 
significantly worse than the control group on the linguistic production subscale. The results 
showed a main effect of the type of pragmatic phenomenon (F(2,136) = 33.98; p < .001; η2p = 
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.33). The interaction between the type of participant and the type of pragmatic phenomenon 
was significant (F(2, 136) =10.78; p < .001; η2p = .137). In this case also, the results revealed a 
linear decrease in scores depending on the type of pragmatic phenomenon considered (F(1,68) = 
56.79; p < .001; η2p = .46). Higher scores were obtained for the production of sincere 
communicative acts compared to the production of deceit and irony (see Table 3). Pairwise 
post hoc comparisons revealed that individuals with TBI performed as well as the controls in 
linguistic production of sincere communicative acts (p = .10), while their performance was 
worse than that of the controls in linguistic production of deceit (p < .001) and irony (p < .001).  
On the extralinguistic comprehension subscale, the ANOVA showed a main effect of the 
type of participant (F(1,68) =27.67; p < .001; η2p = .29). Overall, as for the case of 
comprehension, TBI patients performed significantly worse than controls on the extralinguistic 
comprehension subscale. In both the experimental and control groups we found a main effect 
of the type of pragmatic phenomenon investigated (F(2,136) = 56.99; p < .001; η2p = .46). The 
interaction between the type of participant and the type of pragmatic phenomenon was not 
significant (F(2,136) =2.71; p = .070; η2p = .038). The linear contrast revealed a linear decrease in 
scores depending on the type of pragmatic phenomenon (F(1,68) = 112.80; p < .001; η2p = .62). 
Higher scores were obtained in the comprehension of sincere communicative acts compared to 
comprehension of deceit and irony (see Table 3). Pairwise post hoc comparisons revealed that 
participants obtained higher scores better in extralinguistic comprehension of sincere 
communicative acts compared to deceit (p < .001) and irony (p < .001), and in extralinguistic 
comprehension of deceit compared to irony (p = .001).  
With regard to the extralinguistic production subscale, analysis showed a main effect of 
the type of participant (F(1,68) = 80.32; p < .001; η2p = .54). Overall, the experimental group 
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obtained a significantly worse performance than the control group on the extralinguistic 
production subscale. Results showed a main effect of the type of pragmatic phenomenon 
(F(2,136) = 52.51; p < .001; η2p = .44) in both the experimental group and the control group.  
The interaction between the type of participant and the type of pragmatic phenomenon was 
significant (F(2, 136) =15.86; p < .001; η2p = .189). We performed a linear contrast that revealed a 
linear decrease in scores based on the type of pragmatic phenomenon considered (F(1,68) = 
68.13; p < .001; η2p = .50). The highest scores were obtained in the tasks concerning sincere  
communicative acts, followed by deceit and irony (see Table 3). Pairwise post hoc 
comparisons revealed that individuals with TBI performed worse than controls in 
extralinguistic production of sincere communicative acts (p < .001), deceit (p < .001) and irony 
(p < .001). 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations for comprehension and production of sincere, deceitful and 
ironic communicative acts on the linguistic and extralinguistic scales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2   Cognitive Functions and Theory of Mind Assessment  
The performances of individuals with TBI and healthy controls in the different cognitive 
domains are shown in Table 4. The performance of individuals with TBI was significantly 
different from that of healthy controls in all the cognitive domains: attention, working memory 
(WM), long-term memory (LTM), planning, cognitive flexibility and ToM (t-test: t(68) = 3.44 - 
8.84; all p values < .001).   
 
 
 
 
 
 TBI (n = 35)  HC (n = 35) 
  
 
  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Linguistic 
Comprehension 
 Sincere  .81 .20  .91 .19 
 Deceit  .77 .28  .95 .10 
 Irony  .58 .34  .85 .20 
Linguistic 
Production 
 Sincere  .89 .21  .96 .17 
 Deceit  .75 .28  .96 .09 
 Irony  .42 .40  .84 .19 
Extralinguistic 
Comprehension 
 Sincere  .87 .16  .99 .06 
 Deceit  .58 .31  .84 .17 
 Irony  .43 .33  .68 .27 
Extralinguistic 
Production 
 Sincere  .74 .31  .96 .09 
 Deceit  .68 .26  .97 .08 
 Irony  .27 .34  .84 .17 
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Table 4. Means and standard deviations of tests evaluating cognitive functions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Role of Cognitive Functions and ToM in Explaining Pragmatic Performance in TBI 
Participants and Healthy Individuals   
 
Table 5 – Hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting performance of TBI participants in 
comprehension and production of sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts on both linguistic and 
extralinguistic scales: Model 1 (attention, long-term memory, post-onset time), Model 2 (working memory, 
planning, cognitive flexibility), Model 3 (overall theory of mind). The table shows adjusted regression 
coefficients (R2Adj) for each predictor variable, the change in R2 after the addition of planning and theory 
of mind variables (R2Change), the change in F (FChange) and its significance value (Sig. FChange). 
DVs IVs  R2  R2Change  FChange  Sig. FChange 
Linguistic Comprehension 
Sincere 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .10 
.23 
.29 
 .10 
.12 
.06 
 1.20 
1.49 
2.24 
 .325 
.238 
.146 
Deceit 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .05 
.27 
.53 
 .05 
.22 
.26 
 .49 
2.80 
15.13 
 .689 
.058 
.001 
Irony 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .10 
.43 
.44 
 .10 
.33 
.01 
 1.20 
5.39 
.35 
 .327 
.005 
.561 
Linguistic Production 
Sincere 
Model 1 
Model 2 
 .11 
.29 
 .11 
.18 
 1.30 
2.41 
 .292 
.088 
Cognitive and ToM abilities  TBI  HC     
  Mean SD  Mean SD  t-value  Level of significance 
Attention  .24 .32  .81 .20  8.84  p < .001 
Long-term memory  .29 .22  .66 .14  8.21  p < .001 
Working memory  .46 .26  .66 .23  3.44  p = .001 
Cognitive flexibility  .5 .38  .96 .10  6.93  p < .001 
Planning  .53 .28  .90 .10  7.44  p < .001 
Overall ToM  .76 .21  .97 .08  5.48  p < .001 
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Model 3 .34 .04 1.75 .197 
Deceit 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .03 
.18 
.20 
 .03 
.15 
.02 
 .33 
1.70 
.70 
 .804 
.189 
.410 
Irony 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .03 
.22 
.33 
 .03 
.19 
.11 
 .32 
2.23 
4.34 
 .810 
.107 
.047 
Extralinguistic Comprehension 
Sincere 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .04 
.23 
.25 
 .04 
.19 
.03 
 .43 
2.24 
.93 
 .732 
.105 
.342 
Deceit 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .11 
.25 
.41 
 .02 
.08 
.25 
 1.26 
1.71 
7.23 
 .304 
.188 
.012 
Irony 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .15 
.37 
.37 
 .15 
.22 
.01 
 1.80 
3.20 
.41 
 .168 
.039 
.525 
Extralinguistic Production 
Sincere 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .02 
.20 
.38 
 .02 
.17 
.18 
 .22 
2.03 
7.91 
 .880 
.132 
.009 
Deceit 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .06 
.19 
.45 
 .06 
.13 
.27 
 .63 
1.50 
13.25 
 .601 
.237 
.001 
Irony 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
 .08 
.22 
.23 
 .08 
.14 
.01 
 .89 
1.73 
.35 
 .457 
.184 
.558 
Note: The values in bold indicate a statistically significant FChange. 
 
Overall, pragmatic performance on each individual pragmatic phenomenon appears to 
have been affected by different cognitive functions. Attention, LTM and post-onset time – 
Model 1 – were involved in every task to a certain extent, but their contribution in explaining 
pragmatic performance remains modest at best, and does not significantly increase the level of 
explained variance. The inclusion of Model 2 – executive functions (cognitive flexibility, 
working memory and planning) – in the analysis increased the amount of explained variance 
for comprehension of linguistic irony (F(3,29) = 5.39; p = .005) and extralinguistic irony (F(3,29) 
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= 3.20; p = .039). On including Model 3 – theory of mind abilities – there was a significant 
change in R2 for extralinguistic production of sincere communicative acts (F(3,29) = 7.91; p = 
.009), for linguistic comprehension of deceit (F(1,28) = 15.13; p = .001), for the extralinguistic 
comprehension of deceit (F(3,29) = 7.23; p = .012), for the extralinguistic production of deceit 
(F(3,29) = 13.25; p = .001) and for the for the linguistic production of irony (F (1,28) = 4.34; p = 
.047).  
Moreover, the analyses also show that when considering Model 2, including EF, R2 only 
partially follows the trend of decreasing performance difficulty exhibited by the individuals 
with TBI in dealing with the pragmatic tasks investigated. The R2 values indicate how much 
variance is explained by a certain variable. Indeed, there is an increase in R2, which is in line 
with the detected performance in sincere, deceitful and ironic acts only with respect to 
comprehension ability, both in linguistic and extralinguistic modalities (linguistic 
comprehension: sincere, R2 = .23, deceitful, R2 = .27, ironic R2 = .43; extralinguistic 
comprehension: sincere, R2 = .23, deceitful, R2 = .25, ironic R2 = .37). This does not apply to 
the production ability where, within Model 2 (EF), R2 does not increase in line with the pattern 
of performance exhibited by the individuals with TBI in sincere, deceitful and ironic acts, in 
either the linguistic or extralinguistic modality (linguistic production: sincere, R2 = .29, 
deceitful, R2 = .18, ironic R2 = .22; extralinguistic production: sincere, R2 = .20, deceitful, R2 = 
.19, ironic R2 = .22). 
A similar pattern of results holds for Model 3 (ToM), where the R2 values did not increase 
in line with the trend of performance exhibited by the individuals with TBI in dealing with the 
sincere, deceitful and ironic tasks, either in comprehension or in production (see Table 5). If 
EF and/or ToM were the factors best able to explain the increasing trend of difficulty detected 
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among the pragmatic tasks, we would expect the R2 values to follow the trend of performance 
detected in the comprehension and production of the linguistic and extralinguistic pragmatic 
acts investigated.  
For the control group, we performed multiple regression analyses using the same criteria. 
Overall, different cognitive functions appear to have had a slight effect on the pragmatic 
performance of healthy participants. As in the TBI group, attention and LTM were involved in 
every task; however, their predictive role remained almost constant throughout the tasks, 
explaining no more than 10% of the variance and remaining, at best, very modest and not 
significant. When including Model 2 in the analyses, there were no significant changes in R2. 
The inclusion of Model 3 to explain performance in pragmatic tasks increased the level of 
explained variance, but theory of mind was only significant for extralinguistic production of 
deceit (F(1,28) = 4.73; p = .038).    
 
 
5.  Discussion   
This paper focuses on the roles that cognitive functions, and in particular EF and ToM, might 
play in explaining the ability of individuals with TBI to comprehend and produce 
communicative acts expressed with the intention of being sincere, deceitful or ironic. In order 
to obtain an overview of the communicative-pragmatic ability of individuals with TBI, we 
compared their performance with that of a control group. On both the comprehension and 
production subscales of the linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the ABaCo (Angeleri et al., 
2012), individuals with TBI performed worse than controls for all the investigated phenomena, 
namely, sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts. This result is in line with previous 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
   29  
investigations (Angeleri et al., 2008; Bara et al., 2001; Bara et al., 1997). Results also showed 
an interaction effect between the group (individuals with TBI vs controls) and type of 
pragmatic phenomenon (standard communicative acts, deceit and irony) in linguistic and 
extralinguistic production tasks, showing that the individuals with TBI were more impaired in 
comprehension and production of the most demanding communicative phenomena, namely, 
deceit and irony, while they performed similarly to the controls in comprehension and 
production of sincere communicative acts.  
In line with this result, we detected a decreasing trend of performance in managing 
different types of pragmatic phenomena involving an increasing inferential load for 
understanding and production, i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts. This 
pattern of results held for both the linguistic and the extralinguistic scales, and for both the 
comprehension and the production subscales. This trend of difficulty in the performance of 
individuals with TBI is in line with that reported by Angeleri et al. (2008) and, as they 
proposed, it seems to suggest that following TBI a specific impairment in manipulating 
inferential ability can be observed (see also Bosco et al., 2015). The inferential process refers 
to the cognitive ability allowing a person to fill the gap that exists between what a speaker 
literally says and what he/she communicatively means. According to cognitive pragmatic 
theory (Bara, 2010) handling sincere (standard), deceitful and ironic communicative acts 
requires an increasing inferential ability for both production and understanding. The same trend 
of decreasing performance in managing sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts – 
explained on the basis of the increasing inferential load necessary to perform the tasks – has 
also been detected in children with typical (Bosco & Bucciarelli, 2008; Bosco et al., 2013) and 
atypical development, (autism spectrum disorder) (Angeleri et al., 2016), in individuals with 
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left-brain (Gabbatore et al., 2014) and right-brain (Parola et al., 2016) damage, and in those 
with psychiatric disorders (schizophrenia) (Colle et al., 2013). Furthermore, Bosco, Parola, 
Valentini and Morese (2017) recently found that different brain areas are involved in the 
comprehension of the same speech acts when uttered with the intention of being sincere, 
deceitful or ironic.  
TBI predominantly results in damage to the frontotemporal brain areas, and deficits in 
terms of attention, memory and executive functioning are the most common subsequent 
neurocognitive outcomes (Arciniegas, Held & Wagner, 2002; Stuss, 2011). Moreover, previous 
findings have pointed to a deficit in the capacity to comprehend mental states (ToM) following 
TBI, (e.g., Muller et al., 2010). As expected, and according to the relevant literature (Bibby & 
McDonald, 2005; Happé et al., 1999; Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006; Martin & McDonald, 
2003), our results also revealed that individuals with TBI performed less well, compared with 
healthy controls, in all the investigated cognitive components, i.e., attention, long-term 
memory, working memory, cognitive flexibility, planning and ToM.  
We performed a multiple regression analysis for each individual pragmatic task, (i.e., 
sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts) with each separate subscale (linguistic 
comprehension, linguistic production, extralinguistic comprehension, extralinguistic 
production) as the dependent variable and with the cognitive factors as predictors. Overall, 
pragmatic performance for each single phenomenon appeared to be only partially affected by 
the different cognitive functions. Attention and LTM were involved in each task to a certain 
extent, but their contributions to explaining the pragmatic performance of individuals with TBI 
were very modest and not significant.  
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The percentage of explained variance increased significantly with the inclusion of 
cognitive flexibility, working memory and planning. We observed a significant effect for the 
comprehension of linguistic and extralinguistic ironic communicative acts. The percentage of 
explained variance tended to increase with the inclusion of theory of mind, which was found to 
be a significant predictor of the performance of individuals with TBI in the comprehension of 
linguistic and extralinguistic deceits and in the production of linguistic irony as well as 
extralinguistic sincere and deceitful acts. This result is in line with previous research 
demonstrating the relationship between cognitive functions and pragmatic ability in individuals 
with TBI (Bosco et al., 2017; Honan et al., 2015; Martin & McDonald, 2005; McDonald et al., 
2014). Globally, Model 1 was able to explain only a relatively small amount of the variance for 
each of the pragmatic phenomena considered. By contrast, globally considered, Model 2 
(inclusion of EF) and Model 3 (inclusion of ToM) explained a moderate amount of the 
variance in pragmatic performance of individuals with TBI for comprehension and production 
of irony and deceit. This result seems to indicate the importance of considering the role of 
cognitive factors, especially ToM and EF, when we approach pragmatic disorders in a clinical 
setting, since these cognitive factors might contribute to different extents to affecting the 
pragmatic performance as a whole of individuals with TBI. 
However, the novelty of the present study is that it investigates the possible role of such 
cognitive functions in explaining the increasing difficulty of individuals with TBI in 
comprehending and producing a specific pragmatic phenomenon, comparing different types of 
tasks, i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts. Apart from the above-mentioned 
contribution and analysing the R2 values indicating how much variance is explained by a 
certain variable, the role of such cognitive functions in specifically explaining the decreasing 
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trend of performance in patients with TBI across sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative 
acts, is more limited. The model including EF seems to be able to explain the decreasing trend 
in performance in the pragmatic phenomena investigated (irony < deceit < sincere 
communicative acts) in linguistic and extralinguistic comprehension, although it is not able to 
explain the decreasing performance of patients in the linguistic and extralinguistic production 
of sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts. Regarding ToM ability, this seems not to 
have a crucial role in explaining the decreasing trend of performance of patients in sincere, 
deceitful and ironic pragmatic tasks.  
For explorative purposes, we conducted the same analysis in the control sample. As for the 
TBI group, attention and LTM were involved in each task to a certain extent, and their 
predictive roles remained almost constant throughout all the investigated pragmatic 
phenomena, though significance was never reached. The inclusion of WM, cognitive flexibility 
and planning did not reveal any significant results, and nor did the inclusion of ToM as a 
predictor.  
Our results concerning the role played by ToM in explaining the ability to manage deceit 
seem to be in line with those of other authors suggesting the importance of this type of 
cognitive function in deceit comprehension and production (Peskin, 1996). By contrast, our 
results do not seem to support those of previous studies conducted on children (Winner & 
Leekman, 1991) or on individuals with right-hemisphere brain damage (Winner, Brownell, 
Happé, Blum & Pincus, 1998), suggesting that a ToM deficit is the principal factor in 
explaining difficulty in the understanding of verbal irony. In particular, our results are not in 
accordance with the hypothesis that ToM is the cognitive factor that might explain the 
increasing difficulty of managing irony in comparison to deceit (Winner & Leekman, 1991). 
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For a similar pattern of results or conclusions see also Bosco, Bono and Bara (2012) and Bosco 
and Gabbatore (2017a; 2017b).  
To summarize, our multiple regression analysis suggests that the linear decreasing trend of 
performance we observed for sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts is not explained 
by the increasing role of a pattern of specific cognitive factors, (i.e., attention + LTM, planning 
+ shifting + WM and ToM). We suggest that this decreasing trend of performance could be 
better explained by considering the increasing inferential load underlying sincere, deceitful and 
ironic communicative acts for both the linguistic and the extralinguistic expressive modalities, 
in both comprehension and in production. In particular, our results seem not to support the role 
of ToM in explaining the increasing degree of difficulty experienced by individuals with TBI 
in managing deceit compared with managing irony. Specifically, our results show that a deficit 
of ToM seems to be specifically related to patients’ difficulty in producing and comprehending 
deceit; nevertheless, ToM alone is not able to explain the difference in performance in 
managing deceit compared with irony in individuals with TBI.  
A limitation of the present study is the fact that the sample of individuals with TBI was not 
homogenous. Furthermore, future studies should include, in addition to the pragmatic tasks, 
independent tests focusing on inferential ability, allowing for the possibility of providing 
correlation analyses between these two measures.  
To conclude, considering our results as a whole, we suggest that in addition to cognitive 
factors such as attention, WM, LTM, working memory, shifting, planning and theory of mind, 
the role of the (increasing) inferential processes involved in a specific pragmatic phenomenon 
(see also Bosco, Bono & Bara, 2012; Bosco & Gabbatore, 2017a) should also be taken into 
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consideration in order to understand more fully the communicative-pragmatic difficulty that 
individuals may experience as a consequence of TBI.  
Moreover, taking a wider perspective, the results of the present study might also have 
clinical implications for the development of efficient rehabilitation programmes. Indeed, our 
results suggest the possibility that, in addition to programmes focused on attention, memory, 
executive functions and ToM, an effective and comprehensive rehabilitative plan for 
individuals with TBI might also benefit from the inclusion of specific interventions focused on 
helping the patients to improve their communicative-pragmatic performance. Such 
rehabilitative programmes focused on communicative-pragmatic skills should take into 
consideration the role played by the ability to manage inferences of increasing complexity. 
Indeed, this ability seems to be required for comprehending and producing both linguistic and 
extralinguistic complex communicative acts, for example, irony. Therefore, these rehabilitative 
programmes (see for example, Bosco, Gabbatore, Gastaldo & Sacco, 2016; Gabbatore et al., 
2015; Gabbatore, Bosco et al., 2017; Sacco et al. 2016; Bosco, Parola, Angeleri, Galetto, 
Zettin, Gabbatore, 2018) should include also activities specifically devoted to improving the 
patients’ ability to go beyond the literal meaning of a communicative act, whether expressed 
via language or gestures.   
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Appendix A 
Examples of Items of the Assessment Battery for Communication 
Linguistic communicative acts – comprehension Extralinguistic communicative acts – comprehension 
 
Sincere: Frank, Paula and Claire are sitting at the table 
having dinner. Frank says: “Mmm, this pasta is 
delicious! Who made it?” Paula replies: “I made it!”  
 
 ▪ What did the girl mean?   
 If the participant repeats what the character said:  
▪ Who made the pasta? 
Correct: “She is the one who made the pasta.” 
Incorrect: “I don’t know/She is hungry.” 
 
Sincere: The scene opens with David who is in the kitchen 
and has just finished cooking some pasta. He moves towards 
the door and looks into the study, where we can see Scarlett, 
sitting at the desk, intent on listening to some music through 
headphones and writing a letter. David shows her the plate 
and nods, perhaps also accompanied by a gesture with his 
arm, as if to say, “Are you coming?” and Scarlett nods in 
assent. 
 
▪ In your opinion, what did the girl want to say to the boy? 
If the participant repeats the actor’s reply: 
▪ Will the girl go to sit at the table? 
Correct: “She is joining him soon.” 
Incorrect: “She has stomach ache/She is busy.” 
 
Deceit: Ryan is enjoying some cookies, taking them 
from a small plate on the table. Hearing that his sister 
Julia is coming, Ryan pushes away the empty plate. 
Julia enters the room, looks at the empty plate, and 
asks: “Who finished my cookies?” Ryan replies: “I’m 
on a diet!” 
 
▪ What did the boy mean? 
If the participant repeats what the character said: 
▪ What does it mean? 
Correct: “He didn’t eat the cookies” 
Incorrect: “He wants to lose some weight” 
 
▪ Did the boy say the truth? 
Correct: “No.” 
Incorrect: “Yes.” 
 
▪ Why did the boy say that to the girl? 
Correct: “To deceive her, by convincing her he didn’t 
touch the cookies.” 
Incorrect: “To let her know he is on a diet/I don’t 
know.” 
 
Deceit: Naomi and Josh are arguing, having a pillow fight in 
their bedroom. In all the confusion, Naomi hits the lamp on 
the bedside table, and it falls onto the floor. Having heard 
the noise, their dad comes to their room, puts his hands on 
his hips and with a questioning air and at the same time 
assuming a cross expression, as if to say, “What’s going 
on?”, he points with his finger to the lamp on the floor. 
Naomi immediately picks up a book and shows it to her dad, 
as if to say, “I was reading.”  
 
 ▪ What did the girl want to say to her dad?  
 If the participant repeats the actor’s reply:  
 ▪ What does that mean?  
Correct: “It’s not her fault, she was just quietly reading.” 
Incorrect: “She got a new book.” 
 
  ▪ Did the girl tell the truth?  
Correct: “No.” 
Incorrect: “Yes.” 
 
 ▪ Why did the girl answer her dad with that gesture? 
Correct: “She didn’t want the dad to find out it was her 
fault.” 
Incorrect: “To make a joke.” 
 
Irony: Sarah and James are in a dress shop. Sarah is 
trying on a dress which is clearly too tight for her. 
Sarah asks James: “How does this fit me?” James 
replies: “Well, it looks kind of big for you!” 
 
▪ What did the boy mean? 
If the participant repeats what the character said: 
▪ What does it mean? 
Correct: “The dress doesn’t fit her.” 
Irony: The scene opens with Peter and Alice in the kitchen, 
sitting at a table that has been laid. Alice gets up to fetch a 
pan, which she brings to the table, and pours a ladle of soup 
into the dishes. They taste a spoonful, and both pull a 
disgusted face, as if the soup were uneatable. Alice looks 
questioningly at Peter and Peter takes his fingers to his 
mouth and kisses his fingertips with an expression as if to 
say “Delicious!” 
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Incorrect: “I don’t know/He doesn’t like the dress.” 
 
▪ Was the boy serious when he said that? 
Correct: “No he wasn’t.” 
Incorrect: “Yes.” 
 
▪ Why did the boy say that to the girl? 
Correct: “To make fun of the girl/To be ironic.” 
Incorrect: “To suggest she doesn’t buy the dress.” 
 
▪ What did the boy want to say to the girl? 
If the participant repeats the actor’s reply: 
▪ What does that mean? 
Correct: “That the soup is very good, but it was a joke.” 
Incorrect: “A kiss.” 
 
▪ Was he speaking seriously? 
Correct: “No, it was to make fun of her/to make a joke.” 
Incorrect: “Yes.” 
 
▪ Why did the boy answer the girl with that gesture? 
Correct: “To make a joke.” 
Incorrect: “To deceive her/I don’t know.” 
Linguistic communicative acts – production  Extralinguistic communicative acts – production 
 
Sincere: Mark and Caroline are on the couch reading 
magazines. At some point, Mark goes to the window 
and looks at the beautiful sunny day outside. Mark asks 
Caroline: “What do you want to do this afternoon?” 
 
▪ What could the girl say? 
(When in doubt): ▪ What does that mean? 
Correct: “We could go out for a walk.” 
Incorrect: “I bought a book.” 
 
 
Sincere: Derek’s car is parked in a deserted country lane. 
Derek looks as if he has been there a long time (he keeps 
looking at his watch, raising his hand above his eyes as if on 
the lookout for someone coming; he is on edge...). At last he 
sees a car coming... 
 
▪ The boy needs help. What gesture could he make? 
(When in doubt): What does that mean? 
Correct: The subject moves the hands in a clear way/hitch-
hiking. 
Incorrect: The subject makes a generic and not directly 
intelligible gesture with the hands. 
 
Deceit: Richard is shaving in the bathroom when he 
drops a bottle of perfume in the sink. He quickly wipes 
his face and goes to his room. Shortly after, his sister 
Stephanie enters the room, shows him the empty bottle 
of perfume, and asks: “Who spilled my perfume?” 
 
 ▪ The boy does not want to be discovered. What could 
he say?  
 (When in doubt): ▪ What does it mean? 
Correct: “I was here in my room/I didn’t touch your 
perfume.” 
Incorrect: “I’m sorry.” 
Deceit: Two little girls are playing in a yard. After a while 
Claire hits with her hand a vase of flowers that was standing 
on a table. Having heard the noise, her dad arrives, and he 
puts his hands on his hips as if to ask her what has happened. 
 
▪ The girl doesn’t want to be discovered. What gesture could 
she make? 
(When in doubt): What does that mean? 
Correct: The subject raises his hands as if to say, “not my 
fault”. 
Incorrect: Generic and not intelligible gesture with the 
hands/I don’t know. 
 
Irony: Arianna – who is wearing her glasses on her 
head – is looking for something in the room, holding a 
book in her hand. She tries to read a page but can’t do 
it without glasses. She asks Nathan: “Have you seen 
my glasses around?” 
 
▪ What could the boy say to be funny? 
(When in doubt): ▪ What does it mean? 
Correct: “Try on your head.../have you checked your 
own head?” 
Incorrect: “No, sorry/maybe you lost them 
somewhere.” 
 
Irony: Alisha and John are in the kitchen emptying their 
shopping bags and putting everything in the cupboards. John 
absent-mindedly drops an egg he was about to put away. 
The egg breaks, making a mess on the table…  
 
▪ Imagine the girl wants to make fun of the boy. What 
gesture could she make? 
(When in doubt): ▪ What does that mean? 
Correct: The subject claps/makes a sarcastic gesture to 
scold him. 
Incorrect: The subject makes a generic or undefined gesture 
with the hands/says he doesn’t know. 
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Appendix B 
Neuropsychological tasks 
 
Cognitive domain Test Description Reference 
Attention Attentional matrices The task evaluates selective attention. The 
participant has to bar target digits in three 
different matrices made up of 11 rows of 10 
digits each. The participant has 45 seconds to 
complete each matrix 
Della Sala, Nespoli, Ronchetti 
and Spinnler (1984);  
Spinnler and Tognoni (1987) 
 
Working memory Disyllabic word repetition 
test 
 
The task measures verbal working memory 
span. The examiner reads aloud a list of 
disyllabic words of increasing length, and the 
participant must repeat the words in the same 
order. 
Spinnler and Tognoni (1987) 
 
Corsi’s block-tapping test The task evaluates visuospatial working 
memory. The examiner taps a sequence of up 
to nine square blocks positioned on a wooden 
board, and the participants is asked to repeat 
the sequence in the same order. 
Spinnler and Tognoni (1987) 
 
 Story recall test 
(immediate recall) 
 
The task evaluates immediate and deferred 
recall. The experimenter reads aloud a story 
made of 28 mnemonic units. To assess 
immediate recall, the participant is asked to 
recall the story immediately after hearing it. 
Novelli, Papagno, Capitani and 
Laiacona (1986)  
 
Long-term memory Story recall test (deferred 
recall) 
After the participant recalled the story, the 
examiner reads it again. To assess deferred 
recall, the participant is asked to recall the 
story after 15 minutes, during which s/he has 
been involved in unrelated non-verbal tasks. 
Novelli, Papagno, Capitani and 
Laiacona (1986)  
 
Flexibility Trail Making Test (B-A) The task indexes cognitive flexibility in a 
visual-motor sequencing task. The participant 
must draw lines to connect 25 circles 
distributed over a sheet of paper. In Part A, 
the circles are numbered from 1 to 25, and the 
participant must connect the circles in 
ascending order. In Part B, the circles include 
both numbers (from 1 to 13) and letters (from 
A to L); the participant is required to connect 
the circles in an ascending order but 
alternating between the numbers and letters. 
The difference in completion time between 
part B and part A is used as an index of 
cognitive flexibility (switching). 
Reitan (1958) 
Planning Tower of London This task evaluates planning abilities. Task 
materials comprise a wooden board with three 
pegs of different lengths mounted on it; the 
participant is asked to move three beads of 
different colours (blue, red and green) 
between the pegs to reproduce the figure 
shown by the examiner. The participant must 
Shallice (1982) 
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reproduce the figure in a prescribed number of 
moves to correctly solve the task. 
Elithorn’s maze test The test is an index of spatial planning 
abilities. The task comprises eight mazes 
depicted on a sheet of paper. The participant 
must trace a line on the sheet starting from the 
bottom of each maze in an upward direction 
and passing through a prescribed target 
number of dots. 
Elithorn (1955; 1964); Spinnler 
and Tognoni (1987)  
Theory of mind Smarties task This task evaluates the understanding of false 
belief g. The examiner shows the participant a 
Smarties box that contains a pencil rather than 
the expected sweets. The participant is then 
asked what another person – who has not seen 
the actual contents – will think is inside the 
tube, before it is opened. 
Perner, Frith, Leslie and 
Leekam (1989) 
Sally-Anne task The task assesses false-belief understanding 
using a location-change task. The participant 
is shown a scenario in which a doll (Sally) 
puts a marble in a basket and then leaves the 
room. While she is gone, another doll enters 
the room (Anne) and moves the marble from 
the basket to a box. The participant is then 
asked where Sally will look for her marble 
when she comes back. The participant 
correctly solves the task if he/she recognizes 
that Sally will look for the marble where she 
thinks the marble was located, i.e., in the 
basket. 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 
(1985) 
Strange Stories The task assesses theory of mind abilities. 
Participants are read aloud a series of stories 
that end up with one of the protagonists 
producing an utterance, (e.g., pretence, 
double-bluff). The participant is asked if what 
the character said was true, and why the 
character said that.  
Happé (1994) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
